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ABSTRACT 
Social Media Use and Negative Partisanship among College Students 
(Written by Savannah Maas under the direction of Conor Dowling) 
Since the creation of the United States of America, the political climate has vastly 
changed and adapted, each time period with its own distinct characteristics. Today, the 
American electorate and Congress are more polarized than ever and “negative partisan-
ship” has become a central characteristic in politics. Partisan identities of voters are more 
homogenous than ever and approval rates of opposing parties and partisans are at an all-
time low. People’s political decisions have begun to be more driven by dislike of the 
opposing party than support of their own. Social media has also grown over recent years 
and has begun to play a role in politics. The American electorate and political officials 
alike are able to share, discuss, and argue political information with people across the 
country in a matter of seconds. In this thesis, I examine prior research on polarization, 
partisanship, negative partisanship and studies that explore the relationship between 
social media and politics. I also discuss the reasoning behind the design for my survey, 
which was con-ducted at the University of Mississippi. Last, the thesis concludes with an 
examination of my original survey, which sheds light on the relationship between 
negative partisanship and social media use. 
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Introduction 

 Throughout the political history of the United States, there have almost always 
been only two major political parties competing for power. These parties, and their offi-
cials, are voted in by the citizens of the United States. Naturally, citizens tend to identify 
more with one party than the other. There were periods where a party could remain in 
power for decades at a time and citizens would vote across party lines. However, both of 
those instances have nearly vanished from today’s political sphere. The American elec-
torate has become polarized and there appears to be little common ground between the 
Democratic and Republican Parties (Pew Research 2014). Straight-ticket voting is at an 
all-time high and there is close competition between parties (Abramowitz 2015). That 
being said, the way in which American citizens talk about politics has also changed. 
Rather than simply having policy disputes, citizens and political officials alike have en-
gaged in partisan warfare and will attack the morality and credibility of those from the 
opposing party (Pew Research 2014). Recent research has emerged that studies the effect 
of all of these factors and has coined a term to help explain the current political climate: 
negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster 2017).

 Negative partisanship is premised on the idea that one’s political decisions are 
driven more by dislike of the opposing party than support of their own. And seeing the 
way Democrats and Republicans view and interact with each other, there is little argu-
ment that negative partisanship is prevalent. In addition, there has also been a new factor 
introduced to the political stage: social media. Since the creation of Facebook in 2004, 
social media sites have grown in number and exponentially increased in the number of 
  
users across America. Citizens have the ability to obtain information and interact with 
whomever they desire in a matter of seconds. Social media has also become a platform 
for politics. While some research has been conducted to study the effects of social media 
and politics ( e.g.) Duggan and Smith 2016), my thesis aims to study a more specific 
phenomenon: the relationship between social media use and negative partisanship. I con-
ducted my study at the University of Mississippi, targeting a group that uses social media 
extremely frequently—college students. It is pertinent to study this relationship because 
both social media and negative partisanship will continue to be forces at work in politics. 

 The first part of this thesis addresses background information relating to the sub-
ject and is a literature review that summarizes past findings relating to my study. Follow-
ing that, I present my survey design and explain the logic and details for the study. Next, 
the results section contains original research that contributes to knowledge of the rela-
tionship between social media use and negative partisanship. The thesis then concludes 
with a discussion of some of the implications of my findings. 
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Literature Review: Political Polarization and Social Media Use 
 It is no secret that the American political sphere is rapidly changing and is becom-
ing more polarized. “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological 
lines - and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive - than at any point in the last 
two decades” (Pew Research 2014). Record numbers of ideological uniformity and parti-
san animosity have become characteristic of today’s politics and have played a role in 
increased polarization. 

 In 1952, the American National Election Studies first began measuring party iden-
tification. According to this survey, in 2012, 91 percent of party identifiers (including par-
tisan “leaners”)  voted for their party’s presidential candidate—tying the record set in 1
2004 and matched in 2008. The 2012 House and Senate elections also either matched or 
broke party loyalty records that had been set around 60 years ago. Also gathered from this 
survey, high rates of party loyalty were accompanied by high rates of straight ticket vot-
ing. Both the presidential and House elections and presidential and Senate elections of 
2012 broke records for straight-ticket voting set in 1952 and 1960, respectively 
(Abramowitz and Webster 2015). In the 1990 midterm election, 63 percent of states with 
Senate races voted for the same candidate for president as for Senate. In 2014, 91 percent 
of states did (Bump 2016). And, in 2016, that metric was 100 percent (Phillips 2016). 
This was the first time ever that all states with Senate races on the ballot voted for the 
same party in both the presidential and Senate races (Enten 2016). In sum, the electorate 
is more likely than ever to vote consistently for their party and not vote across party lines.

 Partisan “leaners” are those who identify as “independent” but state that they lean toward (“feel 1
more closely to”) one of the two major political parties.
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 Not only are partisans voting in a more unified manner, but the composition of the 
parties has also become increasingly unified. This is not to say that the political center 
has disappeared, but that partisan subgroups have become increasingly homogeneous 
(Fiorina and Abrams 2015). “Self-identified Democrats have become more homoge-
neously liberal and self-identified Republicans have become more homogeneously con-
servative” (Fiorina and Abrams 2015, 42). The overall share of Americans who express 
consistently conservative or consistently liberal opinions has doubled over the past two 
decades, growing from 10% to 21% (Pew Research 2014). 
2
Not only are the two major parties becoming more ideologically uniform, they are 
becoming much more ideologically distant from one another as well. In public surveys 
conducted in 1994 and 2004, 49% of the public claimed to take roughly an equal number 
of conservative and liberal positions. In 2014, that figure shrunk to 39% (Pew Research 
2014). This shift is representative of both parties moving in opposite directions. More-
over, there is currently almost no ideological overlap between the parties. In 2014, 92% 
of Republicans were reported to be to the right of the median Democrat compared to 64% 
twenty years ago. Similarly, 94% of Democrats were to the left of the median Republi-
can, up from 70% in 1994. This trend is evident not only in the electorate, but also among 
elected officials. As Pew Research concludes, “partisan sorting has contributed to the ex-
treme partisanship seen in Washington and other major capitals” (2014). Officials are 
more likely to be conservative/liberal and they used to be nominated by more heteroge-
 Ideological “consistency” in this case is a relatively high bar. In the Pew Research study cited, 2
respondents were classified as ideologically consistent if they gave a consistently liberal or con-
servative response to a series of 10 issue-position questions.
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neous support groups. Party polarization in Congress has reached a record high and is the 
most polarized it has been since the Reconstruction Era (Hare, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2014). Due to this congressional polarization, there has been an almost complete disap-
pearance of ideological moderates in both parties. 

 And as parties are growing ideologically further apart, the closeness of party 
competition at the national level has also grown. The closeness of today’s party competi-
tion is not typical of American politics. Throughout the history of the United States, there 
have been bouts of time where one party has dominated for multiple election cycles and 
years at a time. As Lee notes, “the last three decades have seen the longest history of near 
parity in party competition for control of the national institutions since the Civil 
War” ( Lee 2015, 77). This competition has fueled partisan conflict because it has raised 
the political stakes for every policy issue. More than ever, constituents of a party are 
more likely to change their position on a policy issue rather than switch parties. And be-
cause there has been great change in the composition of parties and the issues that divide 
these parties, there is every reason to believe these trends will continue. 

 Since 2008, consistent party loyalty has reached its highest levels in the past half 
century (Abramowitz and Webster 2015). Not only have the two constituencies of each of 
the parties changed, the way these two parties interact has also drastically changed. A lot 
of recent research has emerged to study a phenomenon now known as negative partisan-
ship. Negative partisanship develops when the partisan identities of voters are strongly 
related to other salient social and political characteristics. In research reported by Politi-
co, it was found that since 1980, supporters of both major parties, including independents 
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who “lean” toward one party or another, have grown to dislike the opposing party and its 
elected leaders more than they like their own party and its elected leaders (Abramowitz 
and Webster 2017). This notion of negative partisanship became especially evident in the 
most recent 2016 election. A Pew Research survey found that both candidates received 
mediocre ratings from supporters of their own party and record low ratings from mem-
bers of the opposing party (2016) . 
3
 However, it is not just officials of the opposing party that partisans have come to 
dislike. Today, 58% of Republicans have a very unfavorable impression of the Democrat-
ic Party, up from 46% in 2014 and just 32% during 2008. Similarly, Democrats’ highly 
negative views of the GOP have grown from 37% in 2008 to 43% in 2014 and 55% in 
2016 (Pew Research 2016). And it is these feelings that also translate into support of their 
own party’s policies. A greater percentage of Republicans, 68%, say a major reason they 
identify with the GOP is that “the Democratic Party’s policies are harmful to the 
country,” than the percentage of Republicans who say they believe “the Republican Par-
ty’s policies are good for the country,” which is 64%. For Democrats, 68% say they iden-
tify with the Democratic Party because they believe Democratic policies are good for the 
country; 62% of Democrats say they identify with the Democratic Party because Repub-
lican policies are bad for the country. Yet, not only do members of each party see the 
policies of the opposing party negatively, they also reflect those feelings towards the con-
stituents of the opposing party. Seventy percent of Democrats say that Republicans, in 
general, are more closed-minded than other Americans and 42% say Republicans are 
 It is important to note that the 2016 election between Clinton and Trump was likely influenced by factors 3
other than negative partisanship.
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more dishonest. Similarly, 47% of Republicans view Democrats as immoral and 46% 
view them as lazy. In addition, Republicans and Democrats are similar in the fact that 
about 42% of party identifiers from each party say that it would be easier to get along 
with a new neighbor who belongs to their own party rather than a new neighbor who does 
not belong to their own party (Pew Research 2016). 

 One of the explanations for these widely-held distastes of opposing parties is that 
“party polarization is also a social process where partisans are driven by a growing team 
spirit that is disconnected from policy considerations” (Mason 2015, 55). When partisan 
and ideological identities intensify and become more aligned, people become more preju-
diced against partisan opponents. Mason examined American National Election Studies 
data and found that no matter what one believes about policy, we are growing prejudiced 
against our opponents, more vocal, and more emotionally volatile (2015, 56). Research in 
social psychology has found that when one of our social groups (i.e., Republicans) is in 
conflict with another group (i.e., Democrats) that group identity becomes more central to 
the idea of who we are. As a result, people are more likely to respond to politics as mem-
bers of partisan teams rather than as citizens. Because many people seem to have adopted 
a team mentality when it comes to politics, humans are naturally hard-wired to feel like 
losers when their group loses, and to feel like winners when their group wins (Mason 
2015, 58). In terms of social groups, when our social group is under threat, humans natu-
rally lash out at our opponents. All in all, even though partisans can believe they are re-
sponding to specific policy disputes, they are also being driven by a natural instinct to 
defend their social group. It has been shown that social polarization is driven more so by 
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political identities than policy opinions (Mason 2015, 59). In terms of what that means 
for the nation, it means that there is a whole group of partisans who act like they disagree 
more than they probably do. It does not matter whether partisans agree or disagree, or 
what the argument is about, partisans just want their side to win. As Mason concludes, 
“the more sorted and powerful our political identities become, the less capable we are of 
treating our opponents with fairness and equanimity” (2015, 60). 

 One of the reasons animosity between the parties is growing is because the issues 
dividing the parties have changed. When examining the patterns through recent decades 
of how differences between party positions have changed, there is a very evident trend in 
today’s political electorate. Drutman examined the differences between Clinton and 
Trump voters along 12 issue dimensions. He found that “supporters of Clinton and Trump 
are very polarized on identity and moral issues … Trump voters held more negative atti-
tudes than Clinton supporters about black people, are much less supportive of immigra-
tion, and have much more negative feelings toward Muslims” (Drutman 2017, 8). And, 
more than ever, parties are divided across racial and religious lines. In terms of what this 
means for polarization, the differences between parties today makes productive, respect-
ful discussion about politics more difficult. This is in part because when it comes to 
moral issues, they have much more emotion attached to them than, say, government bud-
geting. When someone, or a party, holds views that one perceives as morally wrong, it is 
much harder to find compromise. This inability to see eye-to-eye often leads to mistrust 
and frustration. As a naturally human psychological phenomenon, people sort themselves 
into social groups. Today, parties have become increasingly viewed as one of those social 
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groups. And when the integrity of one’s social group is at stake, they are more likely to 
lash out in order to defend their group. It is because of the fact that today’s divisive issues 
garner more emotion and pull into question the morality of policy that partisans are less 
able to engage in politics calmly while respecting a multiplicity of viewpoints.  
The Media and Political Polarization 
 The way in which we gain political information also plays a role in increasing 
party polarization. In recent decades, the number of news sources and channels has astro-
nomically increased, giving people more choices of where to get their political news. Not 
only has the number of sources drastically increased, these sources are becoming increas-
ingly ideologically defined. A study by Martin and Yurukoglu of Stanford University ex-
plored whether people’s voting behavior is associated with what they see on cable news. 
In 2000 and 2004, a typical Democrat was no more likely than a typical Republican to 
watch MSNBC. By 2008, a typical Democrat was 20 percentage points more likely to 
watch MSNBC. The reverse trend was true for viewers of Fox News. It was also found 
that increased exposure to news from those sources was associated with people’s votes. In 
2008, watching an hour of MSNBC daily was associated with a 3.6 percentage point de-
creased likelihood of voting Republican. On the flip side, watching Fox News for an hour 
was associated with a 3.5 percentage point increased likelihood of voting Republican. 
Fox News and MSNBC do not simply attract like-minded people, they also heighten divi-
sions among voters, which may increase political polarization (Sunstein 2016, 62).  
 It is important to note that a great deal of Americans prefer not to listen to partisan 
media or identify themselves as partisan. Although the American electorate and Congress 
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are more polarized than ever, there are also more Americans who identify themselves as 
“moderates” than ever. However, recent advances in measuring ideological ideal points 
suggests that many moderates are actually more extreme ideologically than their self-
placements indicate (Hare and Poole 2015). Specifically, when researchers  account for 
an individual’s level of political information and where they place common objects (i.e., 
the Republican and Democratic Parties) there is a 38% drop in overlap between Democ-
rats and Republicans and a 46% drop in overlap between Obama and Romney voters 
compared to self-placements (Hare and Poole 2015, 38). In other words, even though 
more and more people are identifying themselves as “moderates” or “independents,” 
when we account for differences in how Americans define “liberals,” “moderates,” and 
“conservatives,” we get a picture of a more polarized electorate than if we rely on self-
placement data alone. 

One of the reasons there is an increase of people who identify as nonpartisan is 
because they believe that openly identifying as a partisan will make a negative impres-
sion on others. This is especially prevalent due to the rise in negative partisanship and 
partisan warfare. “Parties today have been portrayed by the media less as principled rep-
resentatives arguing eloquently for their beliefs and more as cranky children who do not 
want to share” (Klar and Krupnikov 2016, 27). This kind of coverage that portrays the 
parties as stubborn and the disagreement between parties as insurmountable leads people 
to view partisanship, from either party, as increasingly undesirable (Klar and Krupnikov 
2016, 27). The belief that there are negative traits associated with partisanship in general 
often leads people who might identify with a party to avoid identifying as partisans. Al-
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beit, it is important to note that the number of “pure” independents has remained steady 
over the past decades while the number of “leaners” has increased (Klar and Krupnikov 
2016, 18). Leaners, however, tend to behave just like partisans—as shown by the trends 
in straight-ticket voting discussed above. This phenomenon of increasing numbers of 
self-identified moderates is important to note in relation to the media and political behav-
ior. Not only do people have the choice of which station to tune into, but they also have 
the option not to tune into the media. As a result, those people can avoid the news alto-
gether and are less likely to participate (Levendusky 2015, 97). “This means that the 
growth of media choices strengthens the extremes while hollowing out the center, making 
the electorate more divided" (Levendusky 2015, 97).

 With so many options to get political news from, it is easy to tune out or not listen 
to viewpoints that don’t correlate with one’s own. Because diverse groups are now seeing 
and hearing quite different points of view, or focusing on different topics, mutual under-
standing and collaboration becomes difficult (Sunstein 2016, 67). Without having expo-
sure to the competing view, it becomes harder to address divergent concerns of fellow 
citizens. Exposure to competing positions generally increases political tolerance (Mutz 
2006) and many people are more respectful of alternative positions, and more willing to 
consider those opinions to be legitimate (Sunstein 2016, 91). However, people are in-
creasingly funneling their sources of political information and choosing sources that tend 
to reinforce their prior dispositions. Not only are people more likely to listen to news 
sources that agree with their views, but they are also more likely to listen to people that 
agree with their views. An experiment in Colorado in 2005 tested the effects of what hap-
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pens when people with similar views engage in discussion (Schkade, Sunstein, and Hastie 
2007). About sixty people were gathered and separated into more “conservative” and 
more “liberal” groups and were asked to deliberate on three of the most controversial is-
sues of the day. What the researchers found was that, in almost every group, members 
ended up with more extreme positions after they spoke with one another. Aside from in-
creasing extremism, the experiment also had an independent effect: it made both liberal 
and conservative groups significantly more homogeneous, and thus squelched diversity 
(Sunstein 2016, 69). Before the members of each group had begun to talk, they had ex-
pressed a fair amount of internal disagreement. But, after the fifteen minute discussion, 
these disagreements were reduced. This phenomenon related to group polarization has 
also become increasingly important due to the rise of social media.  
Social Media and Today’s Political Climate 
 In 2004 Facebook was launched and then, just a couple of years later, Twitter was 
founded. With the emergence of social media, people now possessed the ability to con-
nect with individuals all over the world in a matter of seconds. It also meant that informa-
tion could be distributed and conversations could happen at rates like never before. In 
many ways, social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter offered new platforms 
for political discussions as well, even if that was not their original intended purpose. 

 Although one might assume that greater outlets for political discussion and in-
creased access to information would be beneficial to the political climate in the United 
States, that is not necessarily the case. As discussed previously, even with television 
sources, people are given the choice of where to get their information. By itself, this is 
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not a problem. But when options are so plentiful, many people will take the opportunity 
to listen only or mostly to those points of view they find most agreeable (Sunstein 2016, 
64). One study was done to test how people react to different news labels attached to dif-
ferent stories. One of the results was that people were three times more likely to look at a 
story if it was labeled Republican if they identified as Republican. In contrast, “Democ-
rats showed a real aversion to stories labeled “Fox,” and the CNN and NPR labels created 
a modest increase in their interest” (Sunstein 2016, 65). More than ever, people now have 
a greater ability to filter out opinions they do not want to hear. People with distinctive 
identities engage in group discussion and are able to surround themselves with the opin-
ions of like-minded others while insulating themselves from competing views. This can 
create a problem for democratic decision making because social media sites can become 
a breeding ground for polarization. 

 One of the major problems with the fact that people can create their own social 
networks of individuals with like-minded views is that it produces echo chambers. As 
demonstrated by the Colorado experiment, people often become more extreme in their 
views after speaking with someone who shares similar viewpoints. And when one’s social 
media base is filled with people with similar dispositions, that effect is amplified because 
people become more confident in their views. Another reason these echo chambers are 
problematic is because it produces more homogeneous views. In other words, people are 
less likely to say something that could potentially not be in line with their partisan ten-
dencies in fear of creating a negative impression among their followers (Sunstein 2016, 
73). Even if people within a group hold a minority opinion, they are likely to silence 
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themselves because they want to be perceived favorably by their group. As a result, 
groups can become more extreme. It is also important to note that group polarization does 
not require interaction on social media, it simply requires exposure to the views of others 
(Sunstein 2016, 73). 

*** 
 In my study, I aim to determine not only how interaction through social media 
with likewise/competing views influences political polarization, but also how mere expo-
sure to likewise/competing views is associated with political polarization as well. The 
study also explores how different personal social networks are associated with how parti-
sans interact with, and view, the opposing party. Just as the way people discuss politics in 
person has changed, it has also changed on the social media front. In terms of echo 
chambers, people often become more confident in their beliefs and are more likely to 
voice opinions that will be supported by others’ predispositions. However, there remains 
a great deal of interaction between partisans who share opposing views. I hypothesize 
that people feel more confident to engage in partisan warfare and, hence, inter party dis-
cussions become more volatile and emotional online. Social media, combined with the 
current factors also affecting polarization, has helped attribute to, and catalyze, today’s 
current political climate of negative partisanship.  
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Survey Design 
 In February 2017, 4,000 University of Mississippi students were randomly select-
ed to participate in a survey. This number of students represents about 20% of the student 
body at the University. The survey was sent to their University issued e-mail accounts. 
The e-mail addresses were obtained from The Office of Institutional Research, Effective-
ness, and Planning at The University of Mississippi. The study was reviewed and ap-
proved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Mississippi. One of the rea-
sons the student body at the University of Mississippi was selected is because the e-mails 
are checked regularly by the students, providing for a fast response rate. This sample of 
respondents was also chosen because many of the questions relate to social media use and 
college students tend to be more active than older generations on social media. This sur-
vey closed on February 14, 2017, and yielded 647 responses. All of the analysis presented 
below relies on the sample of 550 respondents who completed all of the questions (effec-
tive response rate of 14%). 
 The survey consisted of 35 questions about political ideology, partisanship, rela-
tionships between parties, and social media use in relation to politics. In order to get a 
general sense of our respondent sample and to measure negative partisanship, I asked six 
questions about party identification and where each person placed themselves in terms of 
being conservative or liberal. The next four questions asked respondents how they felt 
about the opposing party and how politics affected their personal life, social media aside. 
Four questions asked respondents if/how frequently they get news from social media. The 
remainder of the survey dealt with how social media use and politics are related. Because 
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I am testing both how seeing and engaging with politics on social media is associated 
with respondents’ behavior, I had to have separate questions for each. Nine questions re-
lated to who the respondents follow and what kind of exposure they have to politics on 
social media. Seven questions then asked about how respondents interact with political 
information on social media. For instance, some asked whether or not respondents 
blocked or unfollowed people due to political disagreements. Last, one of the most im-
portant questions asked whether any disagreements about politics on social media caused 
a tension or loss of friendship with someone. Ultimately, this question was used as a 
comparison to see how all of these different factors affected respondents in their daily 
lives. The survey instrument is included in the Appendix. 
 Many of the questions, although important on their own, were cross compared to 
other questions in order to see how they relate. In particular, much of the data was broken 
up and compared to in and out group party ratings. The party ratings were derived from a 
question that asked, “On a scale of 0-100, where 0 is not at all favorable and 100 is ex-
tremely favorable, please rate your feelings towards the [Democratic/Republican] Party.” 
The in/out party ratings were formed by taking the scores from respondents for their own 
party and the opposing party and comparing them. The average in party score is the aver-
age score of what all respondents rate their own party (i.e., Democrats feelings towards 
Democrats and Republicans feelings towards Republicans). The out party score is the av-
erage score of what respondents, both Democrats and Republicans, rate the opposing par-
ty. These measurements were pertinent to the study because the main purpose is to study 
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the associations between negative partisanship, which is supposed to be most closely as-
sociated with feelings of the opposing party, and social media use.

Survey Results

 The results of my study are broken up into two main sections: (1) Partisanship and 
Negative Partisanship and (2) Social Media Use and Negative Partisanship. The former 
addresses the basic composition of students at the University of Mississippi and their 
overall partisanship and general feelings towards politics. The latter is the more central 
focus of this thesis, and is broken into two main parts: the relations between negative par-
tisanship and (1) being exposed to politics on social media and (2) interacting/engaging 
with politics on social media.

In order to measure negative partisanship, I compared a great deal of our data to 
in and out group ratings. The “in group” is composed of individuals’ feelings towards 
their own party; Democrats’ feelings towards Democrats and Republicans’ feelings to-
wards Republicans. The “out group” is composed of individuals’ feelings towards the op-
posing party; Democrats’ feelings towards Republicans and Republicans’ feelings to-
wards Democrats. This is necessary because the theory of negative partisanship is driven 
by the notion that people make more political decisions based off dislike of their out par-
ty than support of their in party. 

Partisanship and Negative Partisanship 
 Of the 550 students at the University of Mississippi who answered all the ques-
tions, 25.8% identified themselves as Democrats, 23.3% identified themselves as Inde-
pendents, and 50.9% identified themselves as Republicans. These figures are consistent 
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with the culture on campus as the University of Mississippi tends to be  more conserva-
tive. When the respondents were asked to place themselves on a liberal-conservative 
scale, ranging from 0 (extremely liberal) to 100 (extremely conservative), the mean for 
the students was 55.1. The students were also asked to give an average rating out of 100 
in terms of favorability towards each party. Overall, the Democratic Party received a rat-
ing of 40.4 and the Republican Party received a rating of 51.2.

 However, those figures begin to differ when I broke up favorability by party iden-
tification. In other words, how Democrats rate their own party versus how they rate the 
Republican Party and vice versa, as shown in Table 1. 
Note: Respondents were asked, “On a scale of 0-100, where 0 is not at all favorable and 
100 is extremely favorable, please rate your feelings towards the [Democratic/Republi-
can] Party.” [bold in original]

 In addition to the differences between parties displayed in Table 1, it is also im-
portant to note that only 5% of Republicans and 5% of Democrats give the opposing par-
ty a rating of 50 or higher. In other words, 95% of all party identifiers give the opposing 
Table 1. Average Favorability Toward the Parties (0-100 scale)
Favorability toward 
Democratic Party
Favorability toward 
Republican Party
All Respondents 40.4 51.2
Democratic Respondents 66.2 18.4
Republican Respondents 25.1 73.0
Independent Respondents 45.1 40.1
!  18
  
party a rating below 50. The mean for the Democrats in relation to favorability toward 
their own party was 66 while their rating of the Republican Party was 18. The mean for 
the Republicans in relation to favorability toward their own party was 73 while their rat-
ing of the Democratic Party was 25. Not only did Republicans tend to rate their own par-
ty higher, they also rated the opposing party higher as well. However, when looking at the 
difference in favorability ratings for both parties, the average difference for both parties 
was about the same, approximately 48 points. This is consistent with the theory of nega-
tive partisanship where ratings of the other party approach zero, but ratings of someone’s 
own party do not as closely approach 100. 

Negative Partisanship and Personal Relationships 
 One of the main purposes of the study is to examine how politics is intertwined 
with personal relationships. The theory of negative partisanship claims that people have 
begun to make political decisions based more off their dislike for the opposing party 
rather than support of their own. It might also be the case that negative partisanship may 
be associated with decisions in choosing/handling personal relationships. When asked 
how much it matters to someone if their friends/family have different beliefs than them, 
40% of all respondents said it did not matter at all what political beliefs they had and less 
than 3% said that it matters very much. Yet, these numbers begin to look different when 
you examine them by partisans. 

 I broke up the data by Democrats/Republicans who fall above and below the 
mean on the average feeling thermometer rating of the opposing party. Figure 1a displays 
that 21% of Democrats who fall above the mean on favorability towards the Republican 
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Party (i.e., Democrats who “like” the Republican Party more than the average Democrat; 
dark gray bars) say that it matters somewhat/very much that their friends and family have 
different political beliefs than them. Yet, that number rises to 41% for Democrats who fall 
below the mean on favorability towards the Republican Party (i.e., Democrats who “like” 
the Republican Party less than the average Democrat; light gray bars). In comparison, 
Figure 1b shows that 48% of Republicans who fall above the mean on favorability toward 
the Democratic Party say it does not matter that their friends/family have different politi-
cal beliefs than them. This number falls 17 percentage points to 31% for Republicans be-
low the mean on favorability toward the Democratic Party. 

! 

Figure 1a. How Much it Matters that Friends/Family have DIFFERENT Political 
Beliefs by Democrats’ favorability toward the Republican Party 
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Figure 1b. How Much it Matters that Friends/Family have DIFFERENT Political 
Beliefs by Republicans’ Favorability toward the Democratic Party

 The respondents were also asked how varying political beliefs affected the com-
position of their friend group. Specifically, they were asked: “Thinking about personal 
relationships and politics, which comes closer to your view?” Overall, 56% of people 
said that it does not matter or that they typically have friends with different political be-
liefs than them (black bar in far left of Figure 2a). Seventy percent of Democrats above 
the mean on favorability toward the Republican Party (dark gray bar in far left of Figure 
2a) said it does not matter and only 29% said it was easier to have a relationship with 
someone who shares the same political beliefs as them (dark gray bar in far right of Fig-
ure 2a). But for Democrats who fall below the mean on favorability (light gray bars), 
only 43% say it does not matter and then 57% say it is easier to have friends with similar 
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political beliefs or it is harder to have a relationship with someone who does not share the 
same political beliefs as them.  
! 

Figure 2a. Views on Personal Relationships and Politics by Democrats’ Favorability 
toward the Republican Party 
	 This trend is evident for Republicans (see Figure 2b), with 63% of Republicans 
above the mean on favorability toward the Democratic Party saying it does not matter 
that their friends/family have different political beliefs than them (dark gray bar in far left 
of Figure 2b). Thirty-seven percent of those Republicans also said that it is easier to have 
a friendship with someone who has the same political beliefs or that it is harder to have a 
relationship with someone who has different political beliefs than them. Then, for Repub-
licans who fall below the mean on favorability towards the Democratic Party (light gray 
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bars in Figure 2b), 42% say it does not matter that their friends/family have different po-
litical beliefs than them and 58% say it is easier to have a friendship with someone who 
shares the same political beliefs or it is harder to have a relationship with someone who 
does not share the same political beliefs as them. 
 In sum, for both partisans, those who view the opposing party more negatively are 
more likely to believe it matters that friends and family have different political beliefs 
than them. They are also more likely to find it difficult to have friendships with those 
same people and to believe it is easier to have friendships with people who share the 
same political beliefs as themselves.

! 

Figure 2b. Views on Personal Relationships and Politics by Republicans’ Favorabili-
ty toward the Democratic Party 
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In other words, negative partisanship is clearly present among college students at the 
University of Mississippi. The next section addresses to what extent social media use also 
plays a role in negative partisanship.

Social Media Use and Negative Partisanship 
 Along with the newer theory of negative partisanship, a new platform for dis-
cussing politics has also emerged—social media. Especially among college students, so-
cial media has become an increasingly integral part of their daily lives. Out of the 550 
respondents, 82% reported using Facebook, 64% Twitter, 85% Snapchat, and 84% Insta-
gram. These sites are also being used as ways of gaining and communicating political 
information. Fifty-nine percent of all respondents reported that they get news and head-
lines from Twitter and 63% reported that they get news and headlines from Facebook. To 
further demonstrate the growing importance of the relationship between politics and so-
cial media, it is important to note that 52% of respondents reported that social media is 
their primary source for political news, 27% said television, and 4% said print newspaper. 
But even if social media is not one’s primary mode of obtaining political information, it 
does not mean individuals are not being exposed to political discussions over social me-
dia. Eighty percent of Twitter users and 91% of Facebook users claim that at least some 
of what they see on these sites is related to politics. It is therefore likely that politics, and 
by extension negative partisanship, and social media use have developed a pertinent, con-
comitant relationship. To examine this relationship, I focus on two main aspects of social 
media use: exposure to politics on social media and interaction with politics on social 
media. 
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Exposure to Politics on Social Media  
 One of the aspects that sets social media apart from many other forms of commu-
nication is that the individual user has a great deal of control over whose opinions they 
are exposed to. Having the ability to follow and unfollow other people on social media 
gives users the opportunity to form their social and friend groups in a way that is most 
agreeable to them. And, for some, political views are one of the factors that shapes their 
social media sphere. 

 Respondents were asked about the composition of the political views of the peo-
ple they follow/are friends with on Twitter and Facebook. A majority (75-76%) of re-
spondents said they followed people with a mix of political beliefs/were not sure about 
the political beliefs of the people they followed and about 13-15% said they mostly fol-
lowed people who shared their same political beliefs. However, for those who follow 
mostly people with the same political beliefs, there are a few trends to note. When broken 
up by in and out party, the groups who claimed to follow people with a mix of political 
beliefs on Twitter, or were not sure about their political beliefs, gave the out party an av-
erage score of 24 (see Table 2a). In other words, those people gave their opposing party 
an average of 24 on the (0 to 100) feeling thermometer. For those who said they follow 
mostly people who share their political beliefs on Twitter, the average out party score was 
a 15. And the same trend follows for Facebook (see Table 2b).  
Those on Facebook who said they don’t know others’ political beliefs or follow a 
people with a mix of political beliefs gave the out party a score between 24 and 27. But 
for those who follow mostly people who share their political beliefs on Facebook, the out 
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party score is a 16. On both Facebook and Twitter, there is about a 9 percentage point dif-
ference in out party scores between those who follow people with mostly the same politi-
cal views and for anyone whose feed is not as homogeneous. However, it is important to 
note that in party evaluations don’t move significantly, just the out party evaluations do. 
This is consistent with the idea of negative partisanship because, in this case, dislike of 
the opposing party is what differs across who one follows on social media.  In other 
words, the more likely one is to follow a majority of people with the same political be-
liefs, the more likely they are to negatively view the opposing party.

Note: Numbers displayed are the average party status when respondents were asked, “On 
a scale of 0-100, where 0 is not at all favorable and 100 is extremely favorable, please 
rate your feelings towards the [Democratic/Republican] Party.” [bold in original]

Table 2a. Who Respondents Follow on Twitter by Party Status
In Party Out Party
Similar political beliefs 72.3 14.7
A mix of political beliefs 70.4 24.1
Not sure about their 
political beliefs
71.6 25.0
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Note: Numbers displayed are the average party status when respondents were asked, “On 
a scale of 0-100, where 0 is not at all favorable and 100 is extremely favorable, please 
rate your feelings towards the [Democratic/Republican] Party.” [bold in original]

 Not only are some people’s social media feeds becoming more homogeneous with 
the beliefs of friends and family, but also with the political figures they choose to follow. 
Overall, a majority of students (52%) say they follow political figures that mostly share 
their same beliefs. For people who follow mostly people with the same political beliefs as 
them on Twitter, 72% of those also say they follow political figures with the same beliefs 
as them. But, for those who said they follow people with a mix of political beliefs, that 
number drops to 52% who say they mostly follow political figures with the same beliefs 
as them. The same trend followed for Facebook, dropping from 70% to 50%. Not only 
are those who follow people with mostly the same political beliefs more likely to have a 
more homogeneous feed all around, but they are also more likely to hold negative views 
of the opposing party. Those who follow political figures with mostly similar beliefs to 
them give the in party a score of 75 and the out party a score of 19. But for those who fol-
low political figures that have a mix of political views, the in party received a score of 66 
and the out party a score of 27. In sum, those that have a more homogeneous feed that is 
Table 2b. Who We are Friends with on Facebook by Party Status
In Party Out Party
Similar political beliefs 75.5 16.0
A mix of political beliefs 71.8 23.7
Not sure about their 
political beliefs
68.7 26.7
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congruent with their own beliefs are also more likely to display stronger support for their 
own party and stronger dislike for the opposing party. 

	 The composition of the beliefs of whom the respondents follow also is associated 
with the respondents view of politics on social media. Respondents were asked how they 
felt about seeing discussions and posts about politics on social media and they were given 
three answer choices: “I like seeing a lot of posts and discussions on social media”, “I am 
worn-out by how many political posts and discussions I see on social media”, “I don’t 
feel strongly about these posts one way or another”.

	 What I found is that those who have a more homogeneous social media feed on 
Twitter, in terms of political beliefs, are 15 percentage points less likely to say they are 
worn out by these posts and 10 percentage points more likely to like seeing these posts 
compared to those with more heterogeneous Twitter feeds (see Figure 3a). 
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Figure 3a. Who We Follow on Twitter by How We Feel About Political Discussions/
Posts on Social Media 
 In Figure 3b, we observe that for Facebook, the trend is the exact same but with a 
difference of 6 percentage points between each category. This is probably because if 
someone has a more homogenous feed and sphere, they are less likely to disagree about 
politics and, hence, less likely to get into political arguments. They are also simply ex-
posed to less opposing viewpoints which, as discussed in the literature review, can trigger 
a social identity response and then cause an argument. 
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Figure 3b. Who We are Friends with on Facebook by How We Feel About Political 
Discussions/Posts on Social Media 
Exposure to Politics on Social Media and Offline Relationships  
	 To take the argument a little bit further, I also examined how being exposed to 
politics on social media is associated with respondents offline (i.e., “real life”) relation-
ships. In order to measure this, I compared two different sets of questions. The first set 
compared the composition of beliefs of the political figures followed and whether or not 
political beliefs affect relationships. The second set compared the composition of the po-
litical beliefs of people followed and whether or not political beliefs affect relationships. 

 Of the respondents who claimed someone’s political beliefs did not matter to 
them, 41% said they followed political figures with mostly similar beliefs (black bars in 
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Figure 4). For those that said it is easier to have a relationship with someone who shares 
their beliefs, 34% followed political figures with a mix of beliefs (light gray bars). This 
left the majority (64%) indicating that they mostly followed political figures with similar 
beliefs as them. Of those who said it is harder to have a relationship with someone who 
does NOT share the same beliefs, however, only 26% follow political figures with a mix 
of views and 74% follow political figures with mostly the same beliefs. Ultimately, those 
who find politics to matter in determining a relationship are also more likely to follow 
political figures that share their same beliefs. 

! 

Figure 4. Views on Personal Relationships by Who We Follow/are Friends with on 
Social Media 
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 I also considered the data from a different perspective. I broke the data into three 
main categories: those who mostly follow political figures with the same beliefs, those 
who follow a mix of people, and those who don’t know about the political beliefs of the 
people they follow. Those three categories were then broken into three different per-
centiles: those who find it harder to have a relationship with someone who doesn’t have 
the same political beliefs, those who find it easier to have a relationship with someone 
who shares the same political beliefs, and those who said it does not matter. For Twitter, 
what I found was those who mostly follow people with the same political beliefs are the 
least likely (35%) to say someone’s political beliefs doesn’t matter as compared to those 
who find it easier to have a relationship with someone who shares the same beliefs (57%) 
and those who don’t know the political beliefs of who they follow (63%). Those who 
mostly follow people with the same political beliefs are also 15-22 percentage points 
more likely to say it is easier to have a relationship with someone who shares the same 
political views. 

 Because social media gives the option of controlling and filtering the opinions one 
sees, it is easier to create a more like-minded following and sphere. Those who follow 
more people with similar political beliefs are more likely to be negatively partisan, less 
likely to be worn out by politics on social media, more likely to follow political figures 
who also share the same political beliefs, more likely to believe it is easier to have friends 
with the same beliefs, and more likely to believe it is harder to have friends with different 
political beliefs. However, these figures only begin to address one function of social me-
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dia—the exposure and availability of information. In the next section, I address how the 
interaction with politics over social media is also associated with negative partisanship. 
Interaction with Politics on Social Media

 In this section of the results, I primarily focus on the relationship between engag-
ing/interacting with political information on social media and negative partisanship. It is 
important to note that the exposure to political information and the interaction with polit-
ical information are not two completely separate phenomena. Both affect one another and 
both undoubtedly affect our daily lives. In this section I will demonstrate first how expo-
sure relates to interaction and then how the interaction affects the respondents. To exam-
ine how the interaction/engagement with political information is related to negative parti-
sanship, this section is broken into three different sets of results: how often one posts, 
how we view politics on social media, and how we respond to politics on social media.  
 Not only is the amount/kind of exposure to politics on social media associated 
with respondents’ views and feelings towards politics, but it also affects how respondents 
engage with political information over social media. As stated previously, 80% of all 
Twitter uses and 91% of all Facebook users claim to see some politics on their feed. On 
Twitter, if respondents claim to see politics, 33% of them also post about politics. But for 
those who don’t see any politics, 0% report posting about politics. For Facebook, 25% of 
those who see politics also post about it. More or less, the more someone is exposed to 
politics on social media, the more likely they are to post about politics.  
 And the amount someone posts on social media about politics is also associated 
with their in/out party status. Overall, 27% of respondents say they post some politics on 
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Twitter and 23% say they post some politics on Facebook. In order to examine whether or 
not the amount someone posted about politics is associated with negative partisanship, I 
examined the frequency of these posts as compared to in and out party ratings, as dis-
played in Figure 5. When asked, “How often do you comment, post, or discuss govern-
ment and politics on social media?” I found that those who comment often or sometimes 
(black bars) gave the out party a score of 17. But for those who claim they never post 
about politics (dark gray bars), the average out party score was a 26. The more frequently 
respondents posted about politics, the lower the score they gave the opposing party. Fur-
thermore, those that claim to post at least some politics are two times more likely to have 
answered “Yes” to the question, “Has a political disagreement/argument on social media 
caused a tension or loss of friendship with someone?” (see Figure 6).

! 

Figure 5. How Often Someone Posts about Politics by Party Status 
!  34
  
 

! 

Figure 6. Percent of Respondents Who Have had a Political Disagreement/Argu-
ment on Social Media that Caused a Tension or Loss of Friendship by whether they 
Post About Politics on Social Media  
 Furthermore, whether someone posts about politics on social media is associated 
with how they view political discussions and posts on social media. On Twitter, 37% of 
people who say they post about politics on social media also say they like seeing a lot of 
political posts and discussions (dark gray bars in Figure 7a). Yet, for those who say they 
do not post about politics, only 11% say they like seeing a lot of political posts and dis-
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cussions (see Figure 7a). The same trend is evident for Facebook with 34% and 13%, re-
spectively (see Figure 7b). 

! 

Figure 7a. If Someone Posts about Politics on Twitter by How they Feel About Polit-
ical Posts/Discussions on Social Media 
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Figure 7b.  If Someone Posts about Politics on Facebook by How they Feel About 
Political Posts/Discussions on Social Media 
 The more often someone posts, the less likely they are to be worn out by politics 
on social media. To make some connections, those that like seeing political discussions 
are also more negatively partisan. Now, one of the options I did consider was simply that 
those who gave the opposing party a lower score might just enjoy engaging more with 
politics in general. However, when respondents were asked “In your experience, when 
you talk about politics with someone on social media you DISagree with do you general-
ly find it to be interesting and informative or stressful and frustrating?” Overall, 66% said 
it was frustrating and 34% said it was interesting. For those that said it was frustrating, 
the average out party rating was a 20 as compared to a 27 for those who said it was inter-
esting. It is important to note that although those who are more negatively partisan are 
inclined to like political discussions and information in general on social media, they are 
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not more inclined to find discussing politics with someone they disagree with on social 
media more stressful and frustrating.

 How respondents view political discussions on social media is also associated 
with how respondents tended to react to politics on social media. One question on the 
survey asked students if they had done any of the following things on social media be-
cause of something related to politics: “changed your settings to see fewer posts from 
someone who disagrees with you politically”; “blocked or unfriended someone who dis-
agrees with you politically”. Because performing these actions offers a negative connota-
tion, many people are hesitant to admit to it. In order to combat that, I also asked a follow 
up question that gave the respondents an option to choose why they had blocked, un-
friended, or changed their settings to see less of someone on social media. The options 
were: “posted too much political content”, “posted things you disagreed with”, “posted 
something you found offensive”, “were abusive or harassing”, and “some other reason”. 
To be sure, the percentages of respondents who said they had done one, or multiple, of 
those things was higher when there was a specific reason given.  Next, I compared the 
data between how people felt about discussing politics with someone they DISagree with 
to whether or not they had performed any of these actions (see Table 3). As displayed in 
Table 3, those who said they found it interesting to discuss politics with someone they 
disagree with were less likely to perform any of the actions, in all six categories, than 
those who said they found it stressful to discuss politics with someone they disagree with. 
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Note: Table entries are percentages. 
 In Table 3, we see that those who find it frustrating and stressful are 14 percentage 
points more likely to have changed their settings, 21 percentage points more likely to 
have blocked someone who disagrees with them politically, 17 percentage points more 
likely to have blocked/unfriended/changed settings to see less someone because they post 
too much, 20 percentage points more likely to have blocked/unfriended/changed settings 
to see less of someone if they posted something they disagreed with, and 14 percentage 
points more likely to have blocked/unfriended/changed settings to see less of someone if 
they posted something they found offensive. Thus, it appears to be the case that people 
Table 3. Reactions on Social Media by Views of Discussions on Social Media 
with Someone who DISagrees Politically
Overall Stressful Interesting
       Have done on social media because someone disagrees politically
Changed settings to 
see less posts
32 37 23
Blocked or 
unfriended
30 37 16
   Blocked/unfriended/changed settings to see less of someone because they…
Posted too much 
political content
46 53 36
Posted things you 
disagreed with
34 41 21
Posted something 
offensive
52 57 43
Were abusive or 
harassing
57 60 53
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who find it stressful/frustrating are more likely to be negatively partisan, more negative 
partisans are also more likely to perform those actions. To be sure, I also more directly 
tested this hypothesis.   
 Table 4 displays the same set of questions, but by in/out party status. The table 
shows that even the numbers for those who were below the mean on the in party (mean-
ing they like their own party less than the average person) were still higher than those 
above the mean on the out party (meaning they dislike the opposing party less than the 
average person). It is the feelings towards the opposing party that appear to drive more of 
these actions rather than support of one’s own party. To further that theory, I looked at the 
difference between those who fall above the mean on the out party and those who fall be-
low the mean on the out party. Those who fell below the mean on the rating of the out 
party, meaning they are more negatively partisan, were more likely to have performed 
those actions across all six categories. 

	 Lastly, I examined how these interactions on social media spilled over into re-
spondents’ offline worlds (i.e., “real life”). As stated previously, those who were found to 
post at least some about politics on Facebook and Twitter are two times more likely to 
have had a political discussion/argument on social media cause a tension/ loss of friend-
ship with someone. 
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Note: Table entries are percentages. 
 Overall, 14% of all respondents said that a political discussion/argument on social 
media caused a tension or loss of friendship with someone. Once again, the percentages 
of those who said yes appear to be driven more by out party feelings than by in party feel-
ings (see Figure 8). Eighteen percent of those who fall below the mean on the out party 
said yes while only 11% of those who were above the mean on the out party said yes. It is 
Table 4. Reactions on Social Media by Party Status
Above mean 
on In party
Below mean 
on In party
Above mean 
on Out party
Below mean 
on Out party
       Have done on social media because someone disagrees politically
Changed 
settings to see 
less posts
30 35 27 39
Blocked or 
unfriended
29 31 24 39
   Blocked/unfriended/ changed settings to see less of someone because they…
Posted too 
much political 
content
43 52 46 49
Posted things 
you disagreed 
with
35 32 31 39
Posted 
something 
offensive
51 54 49 58
Were abusive 
or harassing
58 57 55 61
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important to note that those who are above the mean on the out party are the least likely 
to have answered yes to the question, even a bit less likely than those who fall below the 
mean on the in party. This means that even those who like their own party less than the 
average person are more likely to have said that a political discussion/argument on social 
media caused a tension or loss of friendship with someone than those who like the oppos-
ing party more than the average person. Overall, it is feelings towards the out party, as 
opposed to the in party, that appear to influence respondents’ political decisions the most.

 
Figure 8. Percent of Respondents Who Have had a Political Disagreement/Argu-
ment on Social Media that Caused a Tension or Loss of Friendship by Party Status
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Conclusion   

 There is no denying that today’s political climate is vastly different from the one 
thirty years ago or even a decade ago. With the highest recorded amount of straight ticket 
voting in US history, partisanship has become the single most certain predictor of how an 
individual is going to vote in an election (Abramowitz and Webster 2015). Party competi-
tion is as strong as ever, as is political animosity. Although approval rates of one’s own 
party have not changed a great deal over the years, approval rates of the opposing party 
have dropped tremendously (Pew Research 2014). Negative partisanship has become a 
predominant characteristic of today’s politics. That trend stays consistent with the stu-
dents of the University of Mississippi as on the standard feeling thermometer rating 
(ranging from extremely cold at 0 to extremely warm at 100) Democrats gave the Repub-
lican Party an average score of 18 and the Republicans gave the Democratic Party an av-
erage score of 23. This suggests that the dislike of the opposing party may be a more im-
portant driver of one’s political decisions than support of one’s own party. 

  Just as there has been a good deal of research on the effect of negative partisan-
ship on politics, there has also been more recent research studying the effects of social 
media and politics. My thesis was designed to study the relationship between the two ar-
eas of study: social media use and negative partisanship. It is imperative to begin to study 
this relationship as there is no foreseeable decline in negative partisanship and it is likely 
that social media use will only continue to grow. Citizens use social media sites, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, to share their views, have access to a plethora of political news, 
follow whichever political figures they choose, and to have political debates with people 
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across the country. However, it may be the case that social media is catalyzing the effects 
of negative partisanship. 

 Among my studies most important findings, is that college students at the Univer-
sity of Mississippi who are more negatively partisan are (1) more likely to find it difficult 
to befriend someone with different political beliefs than them, (2) more likely to follow 
people on social media with the same political beliefs, (3) more likely to have blocked or 
unfriended someone who disagrees with them politically, and (4) more likely to have lost 
a friend due to a political argument over social media. It is not a completely linear rela-
tionship, nor is it simply cause and effect. The relationship between social media and 
negative partisanship is complex and interwoven. Albeit, it is certain that at every level of 
engaging with social media, whether it be who we choose to follow or how we feel about 
arguing with opposing viewpoints, negative partisanship is a factor. Although I focus on 
students at the University of Mississippi, it is likely that similar results would be obtained 
with other student populations, if not the general population.

It is impossible to say whether or not negative partisanship that was pre-existing 
causes these factors or whether social media has made people more negatively partisan. 
To determine such would require a study done on subjects over a long period of time to 
see how they changed. Nevertheless, the use of social media certainly does not appear to 
reduce feelings of negative partisanship. For example, those who say that their primary 
source of political news is social media tend to like their own party less compared to 
those who say their primary source is television or print news (Democrats by 8 percent-
age points and Republicans by 3 percentage points).  Moreover, recent research suggests 
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that even being exposed to opposing viewpoints on social media does not necessarily 
help to decrease negative partisanship (Bail et al. 2018). Only time will be able to tell ex-
actly which factor affects the other but, in the meantime, my study and other ongoing 
work provides some important insights on the relationship between social media use and 
negative partisanship. 
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Appendix 
Survey Instrument 
Q1 You are being asked to complete an online research survey that will take approximate-
ly 3-5 minutes. This survey is part of a research study conducted by the University of 
Mississippi. The goal of this survey is to ask you some questions about yourself and ob-
tain your views about public affairs and current events. Findings from this study may be 
reported in scholarly journals, at academic seminars, and at research association meet-
ings. The data will be stored at a secured location and retained indefinitely. Confidentiali-
ty will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. Your participation 
in this online survey involves risks similar to a person’s everyday use of the Internet. No 
identifying information about you will be made public and any views you express will be 
kept completely anonymous. Your participation is voluntary. Even if you decide to partic-
ipate, you are free not to answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any 
time without penalty. There are no known risks associated with this study beyond those 
associated with everyday life. Although this study will not benefit you personally, we 
hope that our results will add to the knowledge about how people form their opinions. 
Note that once you submit responses to the survey the researcher will be unable to extract 
your anonymous data from the database if you wish it to be withdrawn. To participate in 
the study, you must be at least 18 years old and a U.S. citizen. If you have any questions 
about the research, you can contact Conor Dowling at cdowling@olemiss.edu. If you 
have any questions about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the con-
duct of this study, you may contact The University of Mississippi Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs, 100 Barr Hall, University, MS 38677, 662-915-7482, irb@olemis-
s.edu.

oI agree to participate  (1)  oI do NOT agree to participate  (2)  
Skip To: End of Survey If You are being asked to complete an online research survey that 
will take approximately 3-5 minute... = I do NOT agree to participate 
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Q2 Are you registered to vote?

oYes  (1)  oNo  (2)  oDon't Know  (3)  
Q3 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what?

oDemocrat  (1)  oRepublican  (2)  oIndependent  (3)  oOther  (4)  
Q4 If Other, which party is that?

________________________________________________________________ 
Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, 
an Independent,... = Independent

Or Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republi-
can, an Independent,... = Other

Q5 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party, closer to the Republican 
Party, or equally close to both parties?

oCloser to the Democratic Party  (1)  oCloser to the Republican Party  (2)  oEqually close to both parties  (3)  
!  47
  
Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, 
an Independent,... = Democrat

Q6  Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?

oStrong Democrat  (1)  oNot a very strong Democrat  (2)  
Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, 
an Independent,... = Republican

Q7 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?

oStrong Republican  (1)  oNot a very strong Republican  (2)  
Q8 On a scale of 0-100, where 0 is extremely liberal and 100 is extremely conservative, 
where would you place yourself?

Extremely Liberal Extremely Conservative
0 25 50 75 100
(0-100) (1)
!
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Q9 On a scale of 0-100, where 0 is not at all favorable and 100 is extremely favorable, 
please rate your feelings towards the Democratic Party.

Q10 On a scale of 0-100, where 0 is not at all favorable and 100 is extremely favorable, 
please rate your feelings towards the Republican Party.

Not at All 
Favorable
Extremely 
Favorable
0 25 50 75 100
(0-100) (1)
!
Not at All 
Favorable
Extremely 
Favorable
0 25 50 75 100
(0-100) (1)
!
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Q11 How much does it matter to you that your friends/family have DIFFERENT political 
beliefs than you?

oNot at all  (1)  oA little  (2)  oSomewhat  (3)  oVery  (4)  
Q12 Thinking about personal relationships and politics, which comes closer to your 
view?

oI typically have friends that have different political beliefs from me  (1)  oIt does not matter to me what political beliefs someone has  (2)  oIt is easier to have a relationship with someone who shares the same political be-
liefs as me  (3)  oIt is harder to have a relationship with someone who shares the same political be-
liefs as me  (4)  oI do not typically have friends that have have different political beliefs than me  
(5)  
Q13 What is your primary mode of obtaining political information/news?

oPrint Newspaper  (1)  oTelevision News Channels  (2)  oSocial Media  (3)  oOther  (4)  
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Q14 Do you use the following social media sites? Check all that apply. 

▢Facebook  (1)  ▢Twitter  (2)  ▢Instagram  (3)  ▢Tumblr  (4)  ▢LinkedIn  (5)  ▢Reddit  (6)  ▢Snapchat  (7)  
Q15 Do you ever get news or news headlines on Twitter? By news we mean information 
about events and issues that involve more than just your friends or family. 

oYes  (1)  oNo  (2)  
Q16 Do you ever get news or news headlines on Facebook? By news we mean informa-
tion about events and issues that involve more than just your friends or family. 

oYes  (1)  oNo  (2)  
Q17 How often do you comment, post, or discuss government and politics with others on 
social media?

oOften  (1)  oSometimes  (2)  oHardly Ever  (3)  oNever  (4)  
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Q18 Do most of the people you follow on Twitter have...

oSimilar political beliefs to you  (1)  oDifferent political beliefs from you  (2)  oA mix of various political beliefs  (3)  oI'm not sure about their political beliefs  (4)  
Q19 Do most of the people you are friends with on Facebook have...

oSimilar political beliefs to you  (1)  oDifferent political beliefs from you  (2)  oA mix of various political beliefs  (3)  oI'm not sure about their political beliefs  (4)  
Q20 How much of what you see on Twitter is related to politics?

oA lot  (1)  oSome  (2)  oA little  (3)  oNone  (4)  
Q21 How much of what you see on Facebook is related to politics?

oA lot  (1)  oSome  (2)  oA little  (3)  oNone  (4)  
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Q22 How much of what you post on Twitter is related to politics?

oA lot  (1)  oSome  (2)  oA little  (3)  oNone  (4)  
Q23 How much of what you post on Facebook is related to politics?

oA lot  (1)  oSome  (2)  oA little  (3)  oNone  (4)  
Q24 Thinking about posts and discussions you see on social media about politics, which 
comes closer to your view?

oI like seeing a lot of posts and discussions on social media  (1)  oI am worn-out by how many political posts and discussions I see on social media  
(2)  oI don't feel strongly about these posts one way or another  (3)  
Q25 In your experience, when you talk about politics with people on social media you 
DISagree with, do you generally find it to be..

oInteresting and informative  (1)  oStressful and frustrating  (2)  
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Q26 Compared to the political discussions you witness in person, are the political discus-
sions you witness on social media...

oMore civil  (1)  oLess civil  (2)  oAbout the same  (3)  
Q27 Compared to the political discussions you witness in person, are the political discus-
sions you witness on social media...

oMore informative  (1)  oLess informative  (2)  oAbout the same  (3)  
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Q28 How well do you think the following statements describe social media?

Very well (1) Somewhat well (2) Not at all (3)
People say things  
when discussing 
politics on social 
media they would 
never say in 
person. (1) 
Social media has 
helped to bring 
new voices into 
political discussion. 
(2) 
People don't say 
things about 
politics on social 
media because 
they are afraid they 
will get criticized. 
(3) 
Social media helps 
people get 
involved with 
issues that matter 
to them. (4) 
Social media is a 
good way to learn 
about what political 
candidates are 
really like. (5) 
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Q29 How often do you say things on social media, relating to politics, that you would not 
say in person?

oNever  (1)  oRarely  (2)  oSomewhat often  (3)  oOften  (4)  
Q30 Have you done any of the following things on social media because of something 
related to politics?

Yes (1) No (2)
Changed your settings to 
see fewer posts from 
someone who disagrees 
with you politically (1) 
Blocked or unfriended 
someone who disagrees 
with you politically (2) 
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Q31 Have you ever blocked, unfriended, or changed your settings to see less of someone 
because they...

Q32 Has a political disagreement/argument on social media caused a tension or loss of 
friendship with someone?

oYes  (1)  oNo  (2)  
Q33 Do you currently follow any candidates or other political figures on social media?

oYes  (1)  oNo  (2)  
Q34 Would you say the political figures you follow are...

oMostly people who share your views  (1)  oMostly people who do NOT share your views  (2)  oA mix of people with different political views  (3)  
Yes (1) No (2)
Posted too much political 
content (1) 
Posted things you 
disagreed with (2) 
Posted something you 
found offensive (3) 
Were abusive or 
harassing (4) 
Some other reason (5) 
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Q35 People follow political figures they disagree with for a number of reasons. Do you 
personally follow political figures you disagree with because...

▢You like to stay informed about what people on both sides are saying  (1)  ▢You find it entertaining to follow people you disagree with  (2)  ▢You like to argue with the other side's supporter  (3)  ▢You like to share information that makes the other side look bad  (4)  ▢Some other reason  (5)  
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